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ABSTRACT
On 3 May 2019, the UN secretary general António Guterres, tweeted: “No democracy is complete
without access to transparent and reliable information. On #WorldPressFreedomDay, we must
all defend the rights of journalists, whose eﬀorts help us build a better world for all.” How can
we see to it that Guterres someday soon also will promote environmental assessment - on
#FreePlanningDay?
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The free press is a clear example of democratic institu-
tions, with Guterres as one of its protagonists. It aims at
transparent and fact-based public policy processes. Next
to a free press, also environmental assessment (EA) may
have the potential to give access to transparent and
reliable information about our physical development
(e.g. UNEP 2019). The UN Espoo Convention on trans-
boundary environmental impact assessment (EIA) and its
Kiev Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment
(SEA) (UNECE 2019) takes EIA and SEA together as forms
of environmental assessment, part of a larger set of tools
for impact assessment. Might the current demand for
transparent and fact-based public policy processes be
further developed by positioning EA, along with a free
press, as an institution of a ‘complete’ –or rather, ‘liberal’ –
democracy?
The urgency of a call for democratic institutions may
be just as clear for EA as it is for the free press. According
to Freedom House (2019a) liberal democracies, protect-
ing civil liberties and personal freedoms, are worldwide
in retreat. These countries are increasingly changed into
illiberal democracies which have free elections, but
which do not protect the rights of individuals andmino-
rities. In illiberal democracies, winners take all as the
elected regime can control information ﬂows by taking
away the checks that balance their power. This makes it
easier for them to manipulate the information that
informs elections and policy processes. Bent Flyvbjerg
compellingly demonstrates this natural tendency of
hierarchical power with an example from Denmark,
a renowned liberal democracy: ‘He (i.e. a ﬁnancer of his
research with interest in a speciﬁc outcome; SN) con-
gratulatedme onmy new research grant and told me in
no uncertain terms that if I came up with results that
reﬂected badly on his government and ministry he
would personally make sure my research funds dried
up’ (Flyvbjerg 2012, 2019). In Denmark this appeared
a vain threat (which incidentally may illustrate why
liberal democracies typically promote sustainable devel-
opment; ref. Ward 2008). However, the rise of populism
and polarisation inWestern countries, often with attacks
on the institutions of liberal democracy, are clear signs
that liberal democracy is under threat there as well
(Mounk 2018).
According to Dunleavy (2018), “Liberal democracies
combine core ‘macro-institutions’ (like free elections
and control by legislatures) with swarms of supportive
‘micro-institutions’. Among micro-institutions are party
systems, interest group transparency, (social) media sys-
tem (including free press, SN), citizen vigilance, anti-
corruption laws, devolved governance arrangements,
human rights protection and civil liberties" (Dunleavy
2018). If EA would belong in this list as well (a case that
is made further on), the question remains whether, like
a free press, EA is also in retreat. According to UNEP
(2018) in its global review of EA: ‘crucial economic growth
for the beneﬁt of society is perceived to be unnecessary
delayed. This has even triggered legislative changes to
backtrack/weaken the processes in some countries’. As
far as known, there is no systematic review of EA trends in
economies with a weakening liberal democracy. There
are nonetheless some signs that, also in liberal democra-
cies, EA is under pressure. The Conversation, writing
about environmental assessment in the USA and
Canada: ‘The ugly face of post-truth politics is now
becoming deeply embedded in political discourses in
the United States. Canada needs to avoid the same
path’ (Winﬁeld et al. 2018). In The Netherlands, cabinet
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tried to reduce EA checks-and-balances to a minimum
and mostly succeeded, and something similar happened
around social impact assessment in the Australian state of
Queensland a few years ago. There are also signs to the
contrary, however: Ballesteros (2018) observed amongst
other things that in EU countries public participation and
access to information in EIA are improved.
In retreat or not, EA is potentially an institution of
liberal democracy. The Freedom House methodology
includes three indicators for liberal democracy that may
link to development decisions: ‘Do citizens have the legal
right and practical ability to obtain information about
state operations?’; ‘Does the government publish infor-
mation online, and is this information accessible by
default?’; ‘Are civil society groups and citizens given
a fair and meaningful opportunity to comment on and
inﬂuence pending policies or legislation?’ (Freedom
House 2019b). These indicators correspond to reﬁned
checks-and-balances in the political system which the
UN Espoo Convention on EA creates: it protects the rights
of all citizens to be informed before a decision is made
and to express views about government decisions that
will aﬀect them, and the right to be notiﬁed of the
reasons why, considering views expressed, the govern-
ment has taken a certain decision. In many national EA
systems, quality of environmental information is war-
ranted independently from the EA competent authority –
as that authority represents the political majority that
needs to be checked by the procedure in the ﬁrst place.
All these checks, if they work, enable political account-
ability in the electoral cycle: the electorate can take justi-
ﬁcations for political decisions, made transparent by EA,
into consideration in the next elections. If the facts to
which these justiﬁcations refer can be less easily manipu-
lated to serve speciﬁc government interests, from the
point of view of civil rights the balance of power between
government and aﬀected citizens is improved.
Despite the UN’s Espoo Convention, EA does not seem
to be in Guterres’s mind, or in the mind of any main-
stream politician, as an institution of liberal democracy.
For example, EA is not mentioned as an indicator of
Sustainable Development Goal 16 (but neither is a free
press): ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sus-
tainable development, provide access to justice for all
and build eﬀective, accountable and inclusive institutions
at all levels’ (UN 2019b). Advocates of liberal democratic
values may be informed by political scientists, who
indeed hardly recognize EA’s potential. They primarily
conceptualise the link between knowledge and planning
with catchwords like ‘argumentative turn’ (Fischer and
Forester 1993), ‘serviceable truths’ (Jasanoﬀ 1990), and
‘negotiated knowledge’ (e.g. De Bruijn and Ten
Heuvelhof 1999). Their common message is that, whilst
the ‘scientiﬁc’ truth as such is not a relevant factor in
political decision-making, political actors may agree
about facts to underpin joint decisions. The power bal-
ance between them determines if they need to agree
before they can move forward. Their social skills, needed
to build bridging social capital, determine if they succeed
in agreeing. Only few political scientists mention EA as an
institution that helps actors agree about facts by creating
a power balance (but see e.g. Nooteboom 2007). On the
other hand, there are clear documented signs of what
can happen in the absence of any need to agree about
facts, like the case of the Brexit referendum in the UK:
political forces can freely manipulate emotions without
regard for the truth, to increase their power in
a Machiavellian way (Fischer 2016).
EA scientists may less inﬂuence current debates
about our democracy than political scientists do, but
whilst EA scientists see the democratic potential, tech-
nocratic views dominate their literature. It frames the
democratic objective of EA as a ‘pluralist view’, achiev-
ing more citizen involvement in the decision-making
process (e.g. Bartlett and Kurian 1999; returning in
Rozema and Bond 2015; Therivel 2019; Cashmore
et al. 2010). The political pluralist view contrasts with
an a-political ‘technocratic’ view, deﬁning measurable
objectives of EA as substantive (a change of plan),
normative (meeting standards and achieving policy
objectives), and transactive (eﬃciency) (e.g., Therivel
2019). Ideal-typical technocrats assume that EA is
aimed at optimal plan or project design with respect
to a given set of coherent political objectives and
legal standards; in this view technicians almost ‘calcu-
late’ the optimal solution, and there is little need for
political interventions during the planning and assess-
ment process. Ideal-typical pluralists assume the
opposite: in their view there is no such coherent set
of objectives; rather, objectives originate from diﬀer-
ent social groups, objectives are therefore inconsis-
tent, and they largely emerge only in the course of
the planning and assessment process when these
groups are involved. In the pluralist view, political
intervention is therefore essential during the planning
and assessment process, including not just elected
politicians, but all political actors who may think that
they have a stake. This makes EA more a political
process and less a technical process.
As an institution of liberal democracy, EA proce-
dures would be designed for pluralist objectives,
meaning that its eﬀectiveness would be measured
by its contribution to the political agreement about
facts relevant to development decisions, and to less
polarised development politics in general. But such
eﬀectiveness measures are hardly used: in the EA
practice and science, technocratic views overshadow
the pluralist view. As Garb et al. (2007) write: ‘A sim-
plistic, technocratic interpretation of EIA (and SEA) is
clearly falling short of its reality in practice’ (.) 'to date,
few EIA experts are willing to radically rethink the core
nature of EIA as a soft tool that ‘is political to its roots’.
Cashmore et al. (2010) add: ‘Theorising eﬀectiveness
evaluation for impact assessment (.) requires a strong
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analytical focus on politics and power (.). This is an
aspect of impact assessment (.) that is critically under-
developed. (.) it is postulated that focusing on inter-
preting the meaning and implications of plural con-
structions of eﬀectiveness represents a more
productive strategy for advancing impact assessment’.
In other words, EA eﬀectiveness should not primarily
be measured as a development that meets oﬃcial
environmental and social goals, but as more agree-
ment between political and aﬀected groups about
facts that should drive development decisions.
If EA’s democratic potential is not put before its tech-
nocratic potential, EA becomes vulnerable in two ways.
First, the technocratic view allows for illiberal manipula-
tion, as Cashmore et al. (2010) write: ‘The adoption of
a more critical, politically astute and reﬂective lens is thus
a central challenge for future research. This development
is essential if manipulation of these instruments
by powerful stakeholders to maintain the status
quo (Foucaultian “subjectivisation”) is to be
avoided.’ Second, most policy makers will perceive tech-
nocratic EA as ineﬀective, as is actually observed through-
out the world (UNEP 2018). EA cannot achieve most
technocratic objectives. Where coherent legal standards
and policy objectives are missing, politicians have the full
right to make their own trade-oﬀs. Rozema and Bond
(2015) put it like this: ‘EIA is likely to be perceived as
ineﬀective by those stakeholders who share any of the
discourses other than ecological modernization. This is
caused by a restricted EIA mandate to deal with the
underlying justiﬁcation for development decisions in
these cases, the inability of EIA to conserve (protected)
landscape when trade-oﬀs are made, and the assumed
apolitical nature of EIA’. Rozema and Bond (2015) believe
the remaining option is to apply the pluralist view only:
‘In terms of the perceived eﬀectiveness of EIA, thus
brought down to the scale of project development, the
extent to which discourses can be accommodated is
crucial if more “inclusive democracy” is to be fostered
through this impact assessment tool’ (Rozema and Bond
2015). ‘Accommodating discourses’ here may be inter-
preted as EA should reﬂect on impacts from more per-
spectives and look for development solutions that satisfy
more of these discourses, either by creative innovation,
compromise or social learning (i.e. evolving discourses).
But such a radical shift toward the pluralist view has
consequences. The jump from agreed facts to decisions
will still be so big that some discourse-based and con-
troversial value judgements remain unavoidable. This
cripples the technocratic approach so much that
Rozema and Bond (2015) even consider that EA needs
to be ‘reformulated as a governance tool’ (not an envir-
onmental management tool). The scope of this shift can
be illustrated with an example. A typical problematic
situation is the conﬂict of perceptions shown in the
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) (UN 2019a) or similar comprehensive sets of
general development goals. EA may be used with the
aim of implementing the SDGs into sectoral policy (i.e.
a technocratic normative objective acc. to Therivel 2019).
In an EA, a sectoral authority can systematically account
for the way it takes each SDG into consideration. EA is
then an incentive for more complex collaborative pro-
cesses that increase the general SDG-related quality of
government decisions. Yet, if the quality of the EA – and
even the whole national EA system – is controlled by an
authority responsible for just the environmental subset of
SDGs, what is its credibility related to other subsets? It
may be better if the procedure were overseen by an
authority without interests in any speciﬁc SDGs:
a ministry of sustainable development or of good gov-
ernance. This aligns with Garb et al. (2007) who write: ‘it
may be more appropriate to instead measure the useful-
ness of the EIA process by its ability to increase the overall
sustainability of the decision-making process’. In other
words: to achieve themost sustainable outcomepossible,
an authority should not be responsible for speciﬁc (e.g.
environmental) development outcomes, but only for the
liberal democratic quality of the assessment process.
Thus it will give any weaker interest (in particular mino-
rities and those concerned with future generations)
a voice by changing the power balance in their favour.
Such a ‘good development governance’ authoritymay be
mandated only to approve the fact-part of decision justi-
ﬁcations, not the associated value-based part, exposing
powerful political networks that try to justify their deci-
sion-making with ‘negotiated nonsense’.
What if EA really were in retreat? Overseeing all argu-
ments above, EA communities then may seek alliance
with scientiﬁc and political discourses in defence of liberal
democracy, like Mounk’s (2018). EA can be framed as an
institution of liberal democracy, radically shifting it away
from technocratic approaches. The EA discourse in liberal
democracies could also be linked to the sustainable (or
inclusive) development discourse: the pluralist perspec-
tive, focusing on restoring balance in development.
However, today, the EA community seems to neglect
this aspect of EA. Environmental movements still tend
to ‘hijack’ the sustainable development and EA discourse,
limiting it to ‘environmental sustainability’, usually includ-
ing pollution, health and degradation of nature and nat-
ural resources, but apart from social and economic
sustainability. This makes it diﬃcult to link EA’s narrative
to the more general liberal democracy discourse.
But worse, the EA community has no consolidated
narrative about its liberal democratic working mechan-
ism. According to UNEP (2019, p. 240): ‘It is worth noting
that while there is substantial agreement on the impor-
tance of environmental rule of law and the signiﬁcant
costs when it is weak, there is limited empirical data on
which approaches are most eﬀective and under what
circumstances.’ These approaches include diﬀerent
forms of EA. If EA is a micro-institution of liberal democ-
racy, of higher order than the individual checks-and-
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balances it creates between a government and its citizens
when a country develops, but of lesser order than
a macro-institution like a free press, these checks-and-
balances can be seen as nano-institutions. For example,
an EA Decree may be deﬁned as a micro-institution,
whilst mandatory publication of EA report and a right of
appeal in case the procedure has not been properly
applied can be two of its nano-institutions. The interplay
between EA’s diﬀerent nano-institutions will determine
its pluralist eﬀectiveness: more agreement about facts,
and less polarisation. Without a stronger narrative, EA is
defenceless against illiberal forces, leaving room to dis-
miss it as a superﬂuous technocratic instrument, or
manipulating it to the ends of an unchecked political
hierarchy.
Those concerned with EA eﬀectiveness and its
sheer survival should consider to radically reposition
EA. In illiberal countries where a pluralist discourse is
indefensible, EA may still be of some use as
a technocratic tool (Trojan horse perhaps, paving the
way for liberal democracy), in which case the secre-
tary-general of the United Nations may try to con-
vince these countries otherwise on #FreePlanningDay.
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